Enablers of Self-Synchronization for Network-Centric Operations:  Design of a Complex Command and Control Experiment by Hutchins, Susan G. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2001-06
Enablers of Self-Synchronization for
Network-Centric Operations:  Design of
a Complex Command and Control Experiment
Hutchins, Susan G.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/41232
Enablers of Self-Synchronization for Network-Centric Operations:
Design of a Complex Command and Control Experiment
Susan G. Hutchins,*1 David L Kleinman,1 Susan P. Hocevar,2
William G. Kemple,1 and Gary R. Porter1
1Naval Postgraduate School, C4I Academic Group, 589 Dyer Road, Monterey, CA 93943
2Naval Postgraduate School, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy (GSBPP),
Monterey, CA 93943     Corresponding author  (831) 656-3768
  shutchins@nps.navy.mil
Abstract
Modified human decision-making processes are required—in addition to new
tactics and technology that are also currently under development—to enable Joint
military forces to operate in a time span that is shorter than an adversary’s. Self-
synchronization is viewed as an essential process within military organizations
that can increase speed of command and thus accelerate execution of the mission.
This process of self-synchronization is described as the ability of a well-informed
force to organize and synchronize complex warfare activities from the bottom up.
The organizing principles are unity of effort, clearly articulated commander’s
intent, and carefully crafted rules of engagement. Self-synchronization is viewed
as a mechanism to overcome the loss of combat power inherent in top-down,
command-directed coordination that is characteristic of conventional command
and control doctrine. The planning that took place to prepare for a complex,
command and control, team-in-the-loop experiment, examining self-
synchronization, is the focus for this paper. The objective of the experiment was
to determine the conditions under which self-synchronization can most effectively
be achieved. In particular, we discuss the activities that led to formulating the
hypotheses for the the experiment, and the efforts that were needed to actually run
the experiment. These efforts included conducting a pre-experiment seminar
game, crafting the scenario, experimental design development, independent
variable manipulation, data collection methods and instruments, and simulator
software modification. Some initial results and lessons learned will also be
discussed.
1.  Background
Self-synchronization is viewed as an essential process within military organizations to increase
speed of command and accelerate execution of the mission. Cebrowski and Garstka (1999)
describe self-synchronization as, “the ability of a well-informed force to organize and synchron-
ize complex warfare activities from the bottom up. The organizing principles are unity of effort,
clearly articulated commander’s intent, and carefully crafted rules of engagement.” (p. 35) One
enabler of self-synchronization is a high level of knowledge of one’s own forces, enemy forces,
and all appropriate elements of the operating environment. Self-synchronization is viewed as a
mechanism to overcome the loss of combat power inherent in top-down, command directed
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coordination that is characteristic of conventional command and control (C2) doctrine. This new
style of coordination offers the potential to convert combat from a step function to a high-speed
continuum (Cebrowski and Garstka, 1999).
Novel concepts, technologies, and innovations—that parallel those that have already occurred in
the business sector—are currently being examined for potential integration into today’s military.
The underlying concept is that advances in technology are leading to dramatic changes in how
the military forces are organized, trained, and equipped for future operations. Developments in
the private sector that allow businesses to dominate the market by developing and exploiting
information superiority provide a model for changes that are underway in the military. These
changes include our enhanced capability to sense and understand the battlespace and most
important of all – our ability to command and control.
Networks that combine information gathering, command and execution are key to both business
and military success. The navy is transitioning from its reliance on large ships to coordinated,
multi-service networks that combine information gathering, command and control, and
firepower. Synchronizing “from the bottom up” focuses on the emergent behavior from within
the organization rather than what occurs in the boardroom or the flag staff offices. The term
“network-centric operations” reflects this fundamental change in thinking in terms of notions
involving such new ideas as self-synchronized versus command-synchronized forces.
1.1  Advanced Command and Control Study
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control
(A2C22) research team, in partnership with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Special
Assistant for Strategic Planning, (N6C), SAIC, and Aptima, Inc., recently completed an
experiment in support of CNO N6C’s Advanced Command and Control (AC2) Study. The
objective of the AC2 study is to investigate the nature of command and control as the US Navy
evolves toward a network-centric concept of future maritime operations. The focus of the
experiment was the conditions (or “enablers”) that promote DMs’ ability to self-synchronize
their efforts. This concept of self-synchronization was examined within the context of a task
force responding to time-critical strike and theater air-missile defense missions.
An innovative “hybrid” approach that combined concept development seminar games with an
experiment process composed of integrated activities, tools, and methods that capitalize on the
NPS A2C2 research team’s capabilities, was used to support an area requiring investigation by
OPNAV, N6C. A multi-disciplinary approach, including seminar games, models and simula-
tions, interviews, surveys, and other knowledge capture method, matches these methodologies to
the requirements of the AC2 study.
A precursor event, Concept Development Game 1 (CDG 1), occurred in December 2000, at NPS.
This seminar-style concept development game was used as a data-gathering activity to derive
hypotheses about how self-synchronization will occur within the organization. CDG 1 served as
a link between N6C’s overall objectives for the AC2 Study and the planning that was necessary
for integrating formal experiments into the AC2 study process. CDG 1 was the first event in a
two-stage “focus” process. The first stage in the focus process sought to identify and explore the
characteristics, conditions, and factors that enable self-synchronization in a maritime force.
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Among the characteristics identified as necessary for a future self-synchronizing force were
trust, a common relevant operational picture, clear commander’s intent, and empowered actors
(Furrer, 2001). The second stage in the focus process was the conduct of the experiment.
The planning that took place to prepare for a complex, command and control, team-in-the-loop
experiment, that occurred over a two-week period in February-March 2001, is the focus for this
paper. In particular, we will discuss the activities and results that led to the research questions
addressed in the experiment, and the efforts that were needed to prepare for conducting the
experiment. These efforts included conducting the pre-experiment seminar game, design of the
scenario, experimental design development, independent variable manipulation, data collection
methods and instruments, and simulator software modification. In addition, we will discuss some
preliminary findings and lessons learned.
1.2  Time-Critical Targets
A task force engaging in ongoing mission tasks must also process time-critical targets, and these
targets, by definition, have compressed vulnerability windows and time-dependent values. Time
Critical Strike (TCS) operations are conducted against targets that pose a “clear and present
danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity that require an
immediate response” (Time Critical Strike Concept of Operations). Timing constraints inherent
in TCS place additional emphasis on coordination and synchronization of these strikes with other
theater operations. Network-centric operations provide the basic foundation required for a
successful TCS mission to occur: (i) rapid information sharing, (ii) more timely development of
situation awareness, (iii) more efficient use of available resources — all lending support to
achieving faster decision cycles. A command and control system capable of rapidly synchron-
izing across the battlespace is critical to support performance of TCS missions. Emerging
technologies contribute the essential infrastructure that provides the foundation for rapid sharing
of information, however, the human decision-making process must also be accelerated by
enabling self-synchronization to occur. In addition to new tactics and technology, modified
human decision-making processes are required to enable Joint military forces to operate in a time
span that is shorter than an adversary’s.
Crafting the scenario included developing a realistic mix of TCS and Theater Air Missile
Defense (TAMD) missions that must be sequenced, deconflicted, coordinated and synchronized
with other ongoing operations. TCS missions include mobile rocket launchers, mobile high-
threat surface-to-air missiles, tactical ballistic missiles and their launchers, long-range attack
aircraft, weapons of mass destruction, mobile C2 equipment, or forces maneuvering in the open.
TAMD missions include the prioritized protection of critical assets, friendly forces, and US
interests from air and missile attack.
2.  Enablers of Self-Synchronization
The basic idea of self-synchronization is to push decision-making authority down to the lowest
level within the organization by relaxing the traditional hierarchical approach to command and
control. In the concept development game seminar the potential attributes, enablers and
inhibitors of self-synchronization were examined. One point that emerged from this discussion is
that self-synchronization is not necessarily a new concept; instead, self-synchronization is
enhanced by modern technology, enabling it to occur in a wider execution space. (Furrer, 2001).
Game participants were selected to represent the spectrum of the US Navy command and control
community of interest (comprising O-2 to O-6) and to provide expert judgment in response to
research issues vital to the future of command and control. A brief discussion of what
participants in the concept development seminar game indicated are the enablers of self-
synchronization follows.
Trust was mentioned many times as an essential ingredient when DMs are required to make
critical decisions in a distributed environment; mutual trust is essential. This means knowing that
the other people in the organization will interpret things the same way and react the same way to
a particular situation. Trust is reinforced when DMs share common training and culture, and by
personal relationships that are developed among DMs. Senior leaders must trust and empower
subordinates, while peers must trust one another to take the correct action within the framework
of existing guidance. Another aspect of trust is that DMs must trust the information in the
network, especially the sources of information used to develop shared situation awareness.
Possessing a common relevant operational picture means that everyone has access to the same
information and this can enable a local on-site commander to make decisions because that person
has all the information needed, whereas in the past, information was not shared by all the
participants. Commander’s Intent refers to an overarching set of goals that is necessary to ensure
people are working with the same guidance. Commander’s Intent, as well as other forms of
guidance given, needs to be clearly written and commanders must also ensure that their
subordinates have a clear, common understanding of this guidance. Empowered actors is another
critical element necessary to create an environment that will promote self-synchronization.
A Command Structure that balances the flexibility of the network with the stability of the C2
hierarchy is viewed as important to commanders making informed, self-synchronized decisions.
A command structure with reduced organizational friction, relational complexity, and reduced
policy restrictions in both formal and informal communications paths will facilitate self-
synchronized actions. Building informal networks for enhancing coordination is also viewed as
an essential enabler of self-synchronization. For example seminar participants indicated they can
often obtain information more easily through the “backdoor.” Shared culture and training is
achieved through training and similar experiences in how people react and interpret a given
situation. If a force is going to self-synchronize it should share a common framework: rules of
engagement, doctrine, Commander’s Intent. These standard processes and procedures must be
common across all fleets and between battle groups if units are expected to be able to “plug and
play.”
The ability and authority to “adapt” refers to the ability to shift from one command authority for
one task to another command authority for another task depending on what is most relevant. We
see what are referred to as “communities of interest” where a subset of people will come together
to work on a particular problem and then go back to their original locations once the problem is
taken care of. This can occur remotely through virtual organizations and through collaboration
using network-based decision support and collaboration tools. This suggests that what is needed
for a command and control structure is decentralization with built in coordination mechanisms.
(For a discussion of this topic see Hocevar, 2000.)
2.1  Independent Variable Manipulation
The objective of the experiment was to determine the conditions under which self-
synchronization can most effectively be achieved. Based on the outcome of the concept
development game, briefly described above, and Cebrowski and Garstka’s definition of self-
synchronization, two variables were selected for manipulation: the command focus held by the
team and the team’s mutual mental model. These two independent variables were manipulated
when participants responded to scenarios that included TCS and TAMD missions. Command
focus was manipulated over two levels: semi-traditional/functional, where commanders were
assigned both a warfare area responsibility as well as their individual platform roles resulting in
functional command responsibilities distributed across the team, and independent unit
operations, where commanders were assigned only platform roles. Mutual mental model was
manipulated on two levels (high and low) and for purposes of this experiment included three
dimensions: situation awareness, commander’s intent, and rules of engagement (ROE). The high
mutual mental model condition included issuance of periodic situation reports by the
commander, detailed, clearly written and unambiguous commander’s intent, and clear, specific
ROE where guidelines were established for time-critical decision processes for each phase of the
operation. Periodic situation reports were envisioned to help team members maintain a high level
of situation awareness by focusing the team on the current tactical and operational priorities.
These dimensions of mutual mental model correspond to Cebrowski and Garstka’s description of
the enablers of self-synchronization: a well-informed force, clear unambiguous guidance and
carefully crafted rules of engagement.
2.1.1 Command Focus
Six major platforms were included in the TSC/TAMD scenario: a carrier, two destroyers, a
cruiser, a submarine, and a frigate. Each platform, along with its weapons systems and/or
aircraft, was controlled by a single DM in the experiment. The first independent variable was
command focus and this was manipulated over two levels: a semi-traditional/ functional
command focus, and an independent unit operations command focus. In the semi-traditional/
functional focus, each of the six Task Force commanders were assigned a composite warfare
command function (i.e., strike, air warfare, surface warfare, undersea warfare, ISR, or a surface
action group) in addition to being responsible for their individual platform. In the independent
unit operations, each Task Force commander was assigned only platform roles.
Instructions provided to participants in the two command focus conditions are provided below.
For the independent unit focus, participants were told:
“Each of you is the Captain of a multi-mission capable ship and its assets. In your
immediate geographical area you are to: monitor all activity in your geographical
area; determine which tasks in your geographical area should be handled, with
what assets, and when; handle the tasks in your geographical area that should be
handled by your assets; coordinate handling of tasks in your geographical area
that should be handled by teammates’ assets; and ensure that all selected tasks in
your geographical area are handled. For the battlespace as a whole you are to
respond to requests by teammates to handle tasks in other geographical areas
using your assets. You are responsible as a team for the overall JFMCC mission.”
For the semi-traditional/ functional focus, participants were told: “The FFG Captain is
commanding an independent SAG guarding the flank. The rest of you are dual-hatted as both a
ship captain and a mission area commander.  The rest of the instructions were similar to the
instructions given above except “mission area” was substituted for “geographical area.”
For purposes of this experiment, the six Task Force commanders reported to a Joint Force
Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) who in turn reported to a Commander, Joint Task
Force (CJTF). The JFMCC was provided with direct command authority over the naval
organizations in both conditions. In the case of the semi-traditional/functional organization,
functional warfare area command responsibilities were distributed across the team, but a CWC
was not represented explicitly. Under the functional focus, commanders were trained to focus on
both global and local roles. Under the platform focus the participants were directed to define
their task priorities first in terms of their platform and it’s local geography; but they were also
briefed as to the overall Task Force mission goals. Table 1 depicts the six composite warfare
command functions included in the experiment, which ship captain was responsible for which
area, and what assets each warfare area commander had to accomplish the mission area tasks.
Table 1.  Roles and assets owned by composite warfare commander functional areas.
Table 2 depicts the six platforms included in the experiment and the assets owned by each
platform commander.  The assets are color-coded to denote who owns what assets, e.g., all assets
belonging to the CVN were green. Assets were color coded when they appeared on the
responsibility
JFMCC FLAG Overall force commander, owns no platforms
STRIKE CVN Carrier with airwing (F18A, F18S, HH60), no PLC
3 F18S 3 on CVN (each with 2 SRM and 1 LRM, replenishable)
33 TLAM 9 on DDGA, 9 on DDGB, 9 on CG, 6 on SSN
9 TTOM 3 on DDGA, 3 on DDGB, 3 on SSN  (each with 1 LRM)
SuWC DDGA Missile destroyer; PLC: Air =none, Surface =20mi, subsurface = 7mi
12 HARP 8 on CG, 4 on FFG
3 F18S 3 on CVN (each with 2 replenishable SRM)
3 SH60 1 on CG, 2 on FFG (each SH60 has 2 MKX)
6 MKX 6 on SSN (+2 replenishable on each SH60)
ISR coord DDGB Missile destroyer; PLC: Air =none, Surface =20mi, subsurface = 7mi
plus 6 UAV 2 on DDGA, 2 on DDGB, 1 on CG, 1 on FFG
SAR coord 3 F18A 3 on CVN
3 F18S 3 on CVN
3 SH60 1 on CG, 2 on FFG
1 HH60 1 on CVN
PLUS, Each platform incl E2C has their organic sensors!!
AWC CG Missile cruiser; PLC: Air =none, Surface =20mi, subsurface = 7mi
30 SM2 8 on CG, 8 on DDGA, 8 on DDGB, 6 on FFG
3 F18A 3 on CVN (each with 3 replenishable AAM)
12 ABM 4 on CG, 4 on DDGA, 4 on DDGB
SAG FFG Frigate; PLC: Air =none, Surface =20mi, subsurface = 7mi
2 SH60 helo for ASW and search & rescue; endurance = 18mins; no PLC
2 MKX: torpedo; range = 15mi
1 UAV unmanned air vehicle used for ISR, endurance = 40+mins; no PLC
6 SM2 Standard surface-to-air missile, range = 80mi
4 HARP Harpoon ship-to-ship missile; range = 60mi
UWC SSN Attack submarine with strike capability; no PLC
6 MKX 6 on SSN (+2 replenishable on each SH60)
3 SH60 1 on CG, 2 on FFG (each SH60 has 2 MKX)
NOTE 1: If any aircraft (F18, SH60/HH60, UAV) are damaged by an enemy SAM site or enemy AAC
they are automatically returned to their base and be available for relaunch after a repair time.
NOTE 2: If any F18 or SH60/HH60 run out of fuel while on a mission they will be automatically
returned to their base and be available for relaunch after a refueling/rearming time.
simulation monitor to facilitate participants monitoring their location. Participants used the color
of their platform as their “call sign” when communicating during the experiment.
Table 2. Assets owned by ship captains in the independent unit operations condition.
0 FLAG Overall force commander, owns no platforms
1 CVN Carrier with airwing (F18A, F18S, HH60), no PLC -
3 F18A     aircraft for air-to air defense; endurance = 12mins; no PLC -
                3 AAM: anti-air missiles, range = 30 mi AAW
3F18S      aircraft for strike misions; endurance = 12mins; no PLC -
                2 SRM: short range strike munitions, range = 15mi STRK/ASuW
                1 LRM: long range strike munition, range = 45 mi STRK
1 HH60     helo for search and rescue; endurance = 18mins; no PLC SAR
2 E2C       prelaunched airborne ISR platform; endurance = , no PLC -
2 DDGA Missile destroyer; PLC: Air =none, Surface =20 mi, subsurface = 7 mi PLC
2 UAV      unmanned air vehicle used solely for ISR, endurance = 40+mins; no PLC -
3 TTOM    positionable weapon platform-carries one LRM; endurance 4 mins -
               1 LRM: long range strike munition, range = 45mi STRK
8 SM2      Standard surface-to-air missile, range = 80 mi AAW
4 ABM     Anti-ballistic missile, range = 70mi BMD/AAW
9 TLAM   Tomahawk land attack missile; range = 250mi STRK
3 DDGB Missile destroyer; PLC: Air =none, Surface =20 mi, subsurface = 7 mi PLC
2 UAV      unmanned air vehicle used solely for ISR, endurance = 40+mins; no PLC -
3 TTOM    positionable weapon platform-carries one LRM; endurance 4 mins -
               1 LRM: long range strike munition, range = 45mi STRK
8 SM2      Standard surface-to-air missile, range = 80 mi AAW
4 ABM     Anti-ballistic missile, range = 70mi BMD/AAW
9 TLAM    Tomahawk land attack missile; range = 250mi STRK
4 CG Missile cruiser; PLC: Air =none, Surface =20mi, subsurface = 7mi PLC
1 SH60     helo for ASW and search & rescue; endurance = 18mins; no PLC SAR
                2 MKX: torpedo; range = 15mi ASW/ASuW
1 UAV      unmanned air vehicle used for ISR, endurance = 40+mins; no PLC -
8 SM2      Standard surface-to-air missile, range = 80 mi AAW
4 ABM     Anti-ballistic missile, range = 70mi BMD/AAW
9 TLAM    Tomahawk land attack missile; range = 250mi STRK
8 HARP    Harpoon ship-to-ship missile; range = 60mi ASuW
5 FFG Frigate deployed as a SAG; PLC: Air =none, Surface =20mi, subsurface = 7mi PLC
2 SH60     helo for ASW and search & rescue; endurance = 18mins; no PLC SAR
                2 MKX: torpedo; range = 15mi ASW/ASuW
1 UAV      unmanned air vehicle used solely for ISR, endurance = 40+mins; no PLC -
6 SM2      Standard surface-to-air missile, range = 80 mi AAW
4 HARP    Harpoon ship-to-ship missile; range = 60mi ASuW
6 SSN Attack Submarine with strike capability; no PLC -
3TTOM     positionable weapon platform - carries one LRM; endurance 4mins -
               1 LRM: long range strike munition, range = 45 mi STRK
6 TLAM    Tomahawk land attack missile; range = 250mi STRK
6 MKX      Torpedo; range = 15mi ASW/ASuW
2.1.2  Mutual Mental Model
The concept of a shared, or mutual mental model (MMM) among team members is used in the
human factors literature as a construct for explaining team coordination under stressful decision-
making situations. A MMM is conceptualized as providing team members with a shared
understanding of who is responsible for what task and the information requirements for tasks.
This shared understanding enables DMs to anticipate the needs of other team members so they
can coordinate their decisions and behaviors. A common, or consistent, model of the tactical
situation among the team members is considered to be a principle component of a MMM (Entin
& Serfaty, 1999). High-performing teams employ MMMs to anticipate both events in the
evolving situation and the information and resource needs of other team members. Cebrowski
and Garstka’s definition of self-synchronization indicates that unambiguous guidance is a key
enabler of self-synchronization. For purposes of this experiment, this guidance was limited to
statements of commander’s intent, ROE, and situation report updates to facilitate development of
situation awareness; these three elements varied in specificity across the experimental conditions.
2.1.2.1  Commander’s Intent.  Commander’s intent in the high MMM condition differed from
that in the low condition in that it contained greater specificity regarding prioritization of the
mission tasks. For example, “The highest priority is to defend our designated protected assets
against missile attack… To reduce the possibility of a successful missile attack against defended
assets, every effort will be made to destroy launch sites before missiles are fired,” illustrates the
level of detail contained in the commander’s intent in the high MMM condition. In the low
MMM condition all the mission tasks were listed but without this level of detail and without
prioritization of the tasks. Similarly, in the high condition specific air and naval bases that were
to be destroyed were clearly designated as well as the fact that enemy ground troops were not to
be engaged. Moreover, in the high mutual mental model condition participants were given the
opportunity to discuss the commander’s guidance to ensure they thoroughly understood all
aspects of this guidance. Commander’s intent is a two-way proposition: the commander has to
communicate clearly and the followers need to hear, understand, embrace, and internalize as the
commander intended. In contrast, in the low mutual mental model condition participants were
not given an opportunity to discuss this guidance with the person who player JFMCC. An
additional difference between the two conditions was that the teams in the high mutual mental
model condition were “empowered to self-synchronize” by the JFMCC’s explicit statement that
he would rely on their initiative and command by negation. In contrast, the degree of
empowerment of task force commanders reporting to the JFMCC in the low MMM condition
was vague. When a team member in the low MMM condition asked the JFMCC a question about
taking certain actions he would ask them for their recommendation or tell them he had to check
with higher authority and then reply back to them a few minutes later in the scenario. This
protocol was arranged to emulate the situation that occurs when clear guidance is not provided
and the ensuing delays that can occur in the decision cycle.
2.1.2.2    Rules of Engagement.   ROE in the high and low conditions had the same level of
specificity, or non-specificity, respectively, as was included in the commander’s intent. The
purpose of these experimental manipulations was to examine the impact that variation in the
clarity and specificity of ROE had on the nature and degree of self-synchronization and the
resulting impact on performance. The idea was to create ambiguity, unnecessary detail and
fuzziness in the “bad” set of ROE which might lead to a delay in responses due to hesitation,
confusion, and additional communications needed to clarify the situation. In contrast, for the
“good” ROE condition, enhanced clarity was predicted to reduce “waste” of scarce assets and
allow greater speed of response to time critical targets.
2.1.2.3  Situation Reports.  The third component used to produce the high level of MMM was
the issuance of periodic situation reports during the scenario in an effort to maintain a high level
of situation awareness. Situation reports were issued by the commander (JFMCC) to the task
force approximately every eight minutes; most of these reports were to alert the team to new
intelligence regarding new SCUD launch sites.. These situation reports were envisioned to help
team members update their mental models of the situation because the commander’s information
focuses the team on the current tactical and operational priorities and updates their understanding
of the situation (Entin and Serfaty, 1999). Periodic situation reports have been demonstrated to
increase overall team performance. To produce the low level of MMM no situation reports were
exchanged.
3.  The Process of Scenario Design
The process of scenario design involved the following steps: (1) specification of “Blue” and
“Red” orders of battle (OOB), that is, the assets that were to be included in the scenario for use
by Blue and Red; (2) tailoring tasks and “seeding” the scenario in order to assist in
operationalizing the (independent) variables being manipulated in the experiment; and (3)
instantiation of assets and tasks within the confines of the game simulation software.  Overall,
this process, involving N6C and NPS, proceeded well and involved iteration and adjustments to
achieve a balance between external “reality” (operational fidelity) and the reality of what could
be implemented (and controlled) in a laboratory environment.  Each of these steps will be
elaborated upon in the following paragraphs.
3.1 Seeding the Scenario with Crafted Tasks
A major aspect of scenario design involved seeding the scenario with “crafted” tasks in order to
provide enough situations where self-synchronization would be necessary among the partici-
pants. A second aspect of scenario design was to introduce a sufficient degree of uncertainty,
confusion and conflict so that both team performance, and the processes employed by the teams,
would be sensitive to differences in a team’s mutual mental model.
3.1.1. Specification of friendly and enemy order of battle
Specification of the friendly and enemy OOB involved three steps. The first step was to cull
from a comprehensive list of all potential assets held by Blue and Red down to a subset of assets
that represented the range of types of assets that would come into play during the envisioned
scenario. The number of differing types of assets was reduced to bring the “asset management”
within reasonable limits for a single individual. Reducing the number of different types of assets
also meant fewer types of assets had to be modeled in the simulation software.
The second step associated with OOB specification involved establishing parameters (e.g., range,
speed, capability) associated with all assets to be included in the scenarios. Parameters for some
assets were modified from their initial settings based on actual asset characteristics.  For
example, the ranges of intelligence, sensors, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms (e.g., unmanned
aerial vehicles) were extended to enable these assets to detect Red assets faster so that the tasks
could be performed when the scenario was played at a 1:10 time ratio. Some platform speeds
were increased to enable more tasks to be performed during a 40-minute scenario, thus more data
points were possible. Some asset capabilities were increased to allow greater flexibility in the
way the DMss could process the tasks and to better represent the capabilities envisioned for
future platforms.
A third step entailed adjusting the number of weapons carried on various platforms (ships,
submarines, and aircraft) to create the right ratio of weapons available to perform the tasks
included in the scenario. A corollary goal for this step was to create the right level of “tension”
via both the scarcity of assets and the timing requirements levied by TCS and TAMD missions.
Each of these steps involved an iterative process to ensure an acceptable level of operational
fidelity and experimental control was achieved.
3.2  Ensure Differences in Process and Performance Due to Mutual Mental Model
A major concept underlying this examination of enablers of self-synchronization is that the
degree of clarity regarding the situation will have a significant impact on both the processes
employed by the team and the resultant performance. This clarity regarding the situation is
conceptualized as being provided by clear, well-written commander’s intent, clearly understood,
well-crafted, specific rules of engagement and periodic situation reports provided by the
commander. Thus, sufficient ambiguity, uncertainty, and conflict (all representing the “fog” of
war) needed to be an inherent part of the scenario so that manipulation of the variables of interest
(independent variables) could have an impact on performance and the processes employed.
An example of providing sufficient conflict involved including enough tasks that needed to be
performed during a given time period that a conflict might be created when a DM may have two
or three tasks vying for attention and needing to be prosecuted concurrently.  These situations
required the DM to prioritize which task was most critical or which resource was most
appropriate. It was hypothesized that the prioritized listing of targets included in ROE provided
in the high MMM condition would facilitate these decisions occurring through self-
synchronization among the task force commanders.  The contrasting hypothesis in the low
MMM condition was that self-synchronization would be impeded and DMs would likely adopt a
more random approach to deciding which target to process first, for example, when confronted
with, a TCS target, a threatening patrol boat, and an approaching hostile aircraft.
An example of a crafted task that produced uncertainty were the pop-up SCUD missile launchers
that were only visible to the team when an ISR asset was within detection range of the launcher.
Each time a new SCUD launcher occurred in the scenario a new intelligence report was shown
on the computer display for all team members.  However, the complexity and workload in the
scenario was such that there would be variation in the self-synchronization of task force
members in the use of ISR and strike assets to prosecute these threats.
3.2.1  Embedding Requirements for Self-Synchronization in the Scenario Design
Several aspects were involved in performing the tasks that required self-synchronizing: these
aspects dealt primarily with the temporal processing of tasks.  It should be noted that virtually all
tasks have a finite time window of opportunity, and as such were time-critical, albeit to different
extents.
3.2.1.1  Serial/sequential processing. Ostensibly these tasks required self-synchronization by
two or more DMs in a time-phased manner.  Examples in the scenario deal mainly with the need
for ISR to locate missile launchers and to determine whether or not a platform is hostile, as a
precursor to weapon assignment.  (Many tasks could not be attacked until they were positively
identified.)  In addition, destroying the surface-to-air missile sites were (soft) prerequisites to the
unimpeded movement of blue aircraft.
3.2.1.2.  Defense in depth.  Similar to conditional sequential processing, defense in depth
involves successive layers of task processing wherein a task not accomplished by one DM
becomes the problem of another DM. Examples in the scenario include the patrol boats,
submarines, destroyers, and aircraft.  Additionally, the SCUD launchers and coastal defense
launchers fall into this category as well.
3.2.1.3  Parallel processing involving two decisionmakers. The requirement for continual ISR
coverage of a target during weapon fly-out and engagement necessitated temporal coordination
between the DM controlling the ISR platform and the DM who fires the weapon.
3.2.1.4  Planning and coordination. The scenario was constructed with purposeful overlaps in
capabilities (and weapon systems) among DMs to foster the need for coordination.  Thus, it was
critical for the team to establish general rules concerning who should do what (tasks) and with
what assets. For example, one mission task was to destroy an airbase and a naval base. To
accomplish this required eight or nine missiles to be launched against each base. Participants
were told that destroying a base required between five-ten missiles. When a team did not
coordinate the use of their missiles to accomplish these tasks, they could have either (a) wasted
missiles by launching more than was required (because typically two or more DMs launched
weapons for this task) or (b) not launched enough missiles to be successful due to not knowing
how many they launched compared to the number required.
3.2.1.5. Time critical tasks.  The primary tasks in this group were the SCUD missile launchers
and coastal defense missile launchers. These tasks required the following subtasks to be
performed in the following order: (1) detection of location, (2) ensure an ISR asset is within
illumination range of the newly detected SCUD missile launcher, and (3) allocation of a weapon
– all to be done before the launcher fired its missile.  The coastal defense missile launcher tasks
presented a lesser problem as their a priori locations were more confined (along the coast), ship-
based weapons could reach them quickly, and there were several means to kill the fired
missile(s).  The SCUD missile launchers, on the other hand, presented a major problem to the
teams. This higher level of complexity was due in part to the wide area in which they could be
resident, the (relatively) short time in which they must be engaged, and the longer flight time
required for a Blue missile to reach the more distant SCUD sites.
Pilot trials during scenario testing showed that SCUD-hunting was nearly impossible using the
original scenario implementation.  Thus, we (1) increased the ground detection ranges of ISR
assets, (2) increased speed on the UAVs, and (3) provided cueing – in the form of intelligence
reports – on upcoming SCUD missile launcher activity.  These actions were all intended to
increase the likelihood of timely SCUD-missile launcher detection.  It was then up to the team to
attack the SCUD-missile launcher before it launched – not an easy job due to the need to tightly
synchronize ISR and weapon activities.  However, the scenario was built such that the first
launch of a SCUD missile provided the team with a location of the launcher, thus the team could
potentially destroy the launcher prior to it launching a second missile.
3. 4  Exploiting Weakness in a Team’s Mutual Mental Model
Testing the hypothesis that a shared mutual mental model among DMs would lead to more
effective self-synchronization and better performance required us to seed the scenario with tasks
that would be sensitive to a shared view of the battlespace, clear ROE, and commander’s intent.
This was done by deliberately introducing uncertainty into the scenario tasks and manipulating
weapons load and overlap among the DMs. The ways in which these factors were manipulated is
described in the remainder of this section.
3.4.1. Uncertainty and vagueness in task processing. The scenario had a number of neutral
shipping and neutral air tasks that r to add clutter and the need for ISR. Other tasks, specifically
the potentially hostile ships, aircraft, and submarines required proactive use of sensor/ISR assets
to determine whether these were in fact hostile.  Acting in haste on these tasks could result in
engaging a non-hostile. Clear ROE and/or team planning are required to specifically delineate
procedures for dealing with these tasks. Another set of tasks was introduced that, although they
were Red forces, they provided no threat to Blue forces, and in turn did not require attacking.
These included reconnaissance aircraft and Red ground forces — assets for which a vague
commander’s intent would lead to uncertainty as to whether these assets were to be attacked.
3.4.2. Confusion and conflict.  Confusion with respect to whom should do what increases with
an overlap in platform or DM capabilities, and must be managed by the team through planning
and coordination.  We adjusted the (functional) overlap so that roughly three or four of the six
platforms shared capability in each of the relevant warfare areas. As the platforms were fixed in
location we designed many task locations and trajectories to “split the defenders” in order to
require real-time negotiation between platforms on a task by task basis. Good team coordination,
or self-synchronization, was required to rapidly allocate who would process which target/s, with
what combination of resources. It was anticipated that the extent to which a team did not
coordinate their overlapping capabilities would be reflected in a waste of weapons and dual
attacks.  Targets that appeared on the “seams” between two or more platforms’ areas of
responsibility might, for example, possibly be engaged by two platforms if they did not
coordinate their actions. This was expected to be particularly relevant for the strike mission area,
as all platforms (except the frigate) had strike capability, and, there were many targets of
opportunity.
3.4.3.  Resource/weapon scarcity.  A major driver of the need to coordinate activities was
weapon scarcity. Too many weapons promote waste and poor planning, whereas too few
weapons makes a perfect solution to the problem impossible; and the “best possible” solution
requires coordination among resource elements. Pre-experiment pilot trials were “played” to
determine the feasibility of accomplishing tasks, as well as to debug the software. The goal was
to create scenarios such that a well-coordinated team, following a clear commander’s intent and
ROE, would have sufficient weapons to meet the threat.  Validation of these allocations of tasks
and resources was accomplished through pilot testing the scenarios, and necessary adjustments
were made.  For example the scenario was constructed such that if the SCUD-missile launchers
were not successfully engaged prior to launch, the team would not have enough anti-ballistic
missiles to destroy every incoming SCUD missile.  This was an intentional design to insure there
was a need for and benefit to self-synchronization or a cost to performing without self-
synchronization.
3.5   Additional Issues Related to Scenario Design
Several additional issues were involved in preparing to conduct this fairly ambitious experiment.
Two of these issues will be addressed.
3.5.1  Time Scaling. We conducted the experiment at a 10:1 time scale.  Thus a 40-minute
laboratory scenario corresponded to about 6.6 hours of “real” time.  This seemed too fast for the
air picture and so maximum aircraft speeds were reduced somewhat.  It also seemed too slow for
surface and subsurface tasks and so these were increased in (relative) speed.  Finding a
satisfactory compromise among disparate warfare areas was a challenge. Moreover the 10:1 time
compression was at or near the limit at which a team could plan activities and perform in a
synchronized manner in response to events in the scenario, as opposed to merely being in a
reactive mode. Post-experiment discussions with participants did seem to indicate that once
teams were trained well the time compression became less of a factor and they generally did not
favor a slower time pace.
3.5.2  Parameter Adjustments.  These have been discussed above, and loom important in the
successful outcome of any experiment.  Parameters include numbers and types of weapons on
each of the platforms, relative speeds of assets, refuel/endurance times, and a host of ranges:
detection, measurement, identification, attack, and the range at which Blue assets could be-
attacked.  A key factor in selecting suitable values is the representation of “real-world” capabil-
ities. However, we must adjust these values to fit the modeling construct of the Distributed
Dynamic Decisionmaking (DDD-III) simulator (Kleinman, Young & Higgins, 1996), and to be
in a range where levels in our independent variables are likely to be reflected in significant dif-
ferences in the collected dependent variables. Another factor to consider is the expected
distribution of workload among DMs. For example, in this experiment the commander on the
carrier had a fairly high workload and aircraft were “chunked” (i.e., each aircraft represented two
actual aircraft) to reduce the number of assets being controlled at any one time.  Short of pilot
testing, parameter values can be adjusted via precursor model-based simulations and sensitivity
studies.
4.  Experimental Procedure
Forty-two officer-students (O-2 to O-4) representing all US military services and some foreign
service officers, from two classes at NPS, Monterey, CA, were organized into seven teams of six
individuals. NPS’s Distributed Dynamic Decision-making (DDD-III) simulation, located in the
Systems Technology Battle Laboratory, was used to drive the experimental scenario and collect
data for subsequent analysis.
The two independent variables were completely crossed to form four experimental conditions
(i.e., two levels of command focus by two levels of MMM produced four experimental
treatments or conditions). The four experimental treatments were semi-traditional/functional
focus and high MMM, semi-traditional/functional command focus and low MMM, independent
unit command focus and high MMM, and independent unit command focus and low MMM.
Command focus and MMM were both manipulated as between-subjects factors (where the
subject element is team). Two of the seven teams were randomly assigned to each of the first
three experimental treatments and the seventh team was assigned to the last treatment condition.
Participants were scheduled for two three-hour blocks of time. During the first block they were
trained to engage in the simulation and to operate under one of the command focus conditions.
The training scenarios were less complex than the scenarios used for data collection. The MMM
condition was introduced during the second block, prior to the two data runs, where two role
players (one for the high and one for the low MMM conditions) briefed the commander’s intent
and ROE. Following these briefings, the participants engaged in a “warm up” scenario and then
conducted two 40-minute data run scenarios.
5.  Data Collection Measures and Metrics
Several performance and process variables were assessed throughout the experiment.  These
measures came from three sources:  measures derived from the log files of the DDD simulation,
measures obtained by trained observers and coders, and self-report measures form the partici-
pants. Two observer-based assessments were used during the experiment; one to rate perfor-
mance outcome and one to rate teamwork behavior. These observer-based assessments
comprised behaviorally-anchored rating scales to rate the behaviors of interest. Ten items
comprised the performance outcome assessment and six teamwork dimensions (communication,
monitoring, feedback, back-up, coordination, and team orientation) were included in the
teamwork assessment.
DDD Derived Measures.  A coordination performance measure will be developed from the log
file data derived from the number of assets required to perform a task and the number of assets
actually used to process the task.  The ratio formed by the number of assets used divided by the
number of assets required (converted to percent) will yield the percentage of coordination
effectiveness.  Latency is another measure that can be derived from the DDD.  This consists of
the time from when a task first appears until it is processed, averaged for all tasks processed (by
category). Several other dependent measures in the DDD log files will be analyzed.
6. Conclusion
Data is currently being analyzed and reports will be forthcoming. Performance differences we
expect to see include the following: Allocation of scarce resources, i.e., weapons across the
battlespace, the processing of time-critical targets; the ability of the force to effectively destroy
time-critical targets; and the matching of force engagements with commanders intent.
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